RISK: Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002)
Volume 3
Number 3 RISK: Issues in Health & Safety

Article 3

June 1992

Risk Assessment and Risk Management: Mending the Schism
Richard M. Sedman
Paul W. Hadley,

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/risk
Part of the Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons

Repository Citation
Richard M. Sedman, Risk Assessment and Risk Management: Mending the Schism , 3 RISK 189 (1992).

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – Franklin Pierce
School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in RISK:
Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002) by an authorized editor of University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.

Risk Assessment and Risk Management:
Mending the Schism
Richard M. Sedman and Paul W. Hadley*
Introduction
In recent decades, risk reduction has become a major mandate at all
levels of government. This has manifested itself in a plethora of new
laws and regulations aimed at reducing risks associated with hazardous
chemicals, motor vehicles, floods, airline travel, nuclear power
generation, occupational-related mishaps and law enforcement.
Concurrently, an effort has been made to develop a
philosophy/strategy for assessing and managing risks, and a 1983
National Research Council (NRC) report I offered important
recommendations. Much of that report focused on technical issues of
risk assessment, but one recommendation did address risk management.
It consecrated the doctrine that risk assessment should be kept separate
2
and independent of risk management:
Experience shows that difficulties can arise from a
blurring of the distinction between the two elements. If risk
management considerations (for example, the economic
effects of a particular control action for a particular chemical)
are seen to affect either the scientific interpretations or the
choice of inference options in a risk assessment, the
credibility of the assessment inside and outside the agency
can be compromised, and the risk management decision
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itself may lose legitimacy.
This recommendation has received surprisingly little discussion. A
recent paper did analyze several case studies and conclude that risk
3
assessors:
must be able to step out of their role as the interpreters of
scientific data and, together with risk managers, provide a
bridge between science and society at the boundaries where
the two interact.
Yet, the authors nevertheless endorse "the central role of objective
scientific, analysis and the distinction between assessment and
4
management activities.'
While there is justification for separating risk assessment and
management, we would like to see more attention given to the possible
limitations of that approach. A decade of experience has passed since the
NRC report was published, and it seems appropriate to reexamine its
recommendations, focusing particularly on instances where it may not
work.
Experience is the primary justification for sequestering risk
assessment from management. It seems to us that there are numerous
situations where risk is routinely assessed and important risk
management decisions are or have been undertaken without a separation
of assessment and management. Here, we explore some of those
situations and suggest that they may cast some doubt on the wisdom of
the universal separation of risk assessment and risk management
activities.
Analogous Experience
Physicians routinely make a diagnosis and then, when appropriate,
afford treatment, acting respectively as risk assessors and managers.
The knowledge of the patient's history and knowledge gained in making
the diagnosis appear to be essential to a successful outcome. Even when
a specialist is brought in or a second opinion is sought, the new
3 Halina S. Brown & Robert Goble, The Role of Scientists in Risk Assessment,
1 RISK 283, 307 (1990).
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physician does not rely on the prior diagnosis but reevaluates it prior to
treatment. In fact, one complaint we have repeatedly heard about health
maintenance organizations is that "factory style" operations interfere
with the ability of physicians to know patients sufficiently well to
provide good medical care.
Clearly, there are potential disadvantages to the physician as risk
assessor and manager. For example, excessive or unnecessary
diagnostic procedures may be performed, or expensive treatment may be
recommended where a physician could realize a financial gain. In spite
of such problems, we doubt that many patients would want to be treated
by a physician who did not thoroughly understand their condition.
About twenty years ago, in an attempt to deal with similar potential
conflicts of interest, a string of small shops opened to diagnose
automobile troubles. The underlying idea was that diagnoses would be
"unbiased" by profits that might be realized in rendering subsequent
repairs. Notwithstanding considerable appeal of this approach, a review
of current yellow pages for the Sacramento area reveals essentially no
exclusively diagnostic auto repair businesses. Whatever the theoretical
advantages of diagnostic shops, consumers apparently did not support
them. Perhaps, failure to link troubleshooting to repair and service led to
misdiagnosis and inflated costs. In any case, consumers have spoken
and appear to demand that autos be fixed before leaving the shop.
As a third exaimple, consider war. War is risky business. The last
two major wars fought by the U.S. had decidedly different outcomes.
Perhaps this was influenced by differences in approaches to risk
assessment and management.
During the Persian Gulf conflict, ultimate decisions appeared to be
made by field commanders who were well acquainted with potential
risks. In contrast, during the Vietnam war, such decisions were made
by commanders in Washington and Saigon who, by and large, did not
directly participate in risk assessments. While field risk assessors
repeatedly informed distant managers that the war was not going well,
managers chose to use measures such as "body counts" and "territory
pacified" to support the proposition that the war was being won. 5
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Nonmilitary problems had to be addressed during both conflicts.
However, the difference in the outcomes may be due in part to the
participation of the risk managers in risk assessment during the Persian
Gulf war.
Another notable consequence probably attributable to risk
management's being separated from assessment was suffered by the
space shuttle, Challenger, and its passengers. The potential for failure of
seals on a solid rocket booster was well known to certain engineers/risk
assessors 6 . However, risk managers, who had to deal with many
other issues, elected to launch the shuttle. Perhaps that tragedy could
have been avoided if those with the most knowledge of the workings of
this complicated technology had been responsible for the launch.
Finally, consider the construction of the Panama Canal. Almost 100
years ago, after expropriating land from Colombia, U.S. attempts to
build the canal were in disarray. 7 As had occurred in an earlier French
effort, construction was taking a terrific toll on workers, was over
budget and was behind schedule.
Management of the project was given over to a railroad engineer
who immediately shut down the project for several years to improve
housing, sanitation and disease control. Then, instead of immediately
renewing excavation, he constructed a railroad.
All this was accomplished in an atmosphere of extreme controversy
stemming from budget overruns, time delays and political pressure.
Fortunately, the project manager was involved in the assessment of
these problems and was able to undertake the appropriate measures in
the face of terrific pressure to get on with the actual excavation of the
canal. On the third try, it was built and still works as designed.
VMTNAM (1988); DAVID H. HACKWORTH ABOUTFACE, '
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6 Fixing NASA, Time, June 9, 1986, at 14. See also, William R. Freudenburg,

Nothing Recedes Like Success? Risk Analysis and the Organizational
Amplifications of Risk, 3 RISK 1, 12-14 (1992).
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Discussion and Conclusions
The doctrine that risk should be managed by a separate group of
managers is consistent with broader trends that developed in the 1970's.
Schools of management adopted the belief that a good manager, using
the proper tools, should be able to manage anything. It is now being
generally realized that effective managers must know their product.8
There is no reason to believe that this is not as true for managing risk as
for managing anything else.
A natural consequence of managers not participating in risk
assessment is the emphasis on nonproduct issues. Often risk managers
will focus on issues they understand. These include public relations,
process, meetings, micromanagement, mission statements, community
relations, politics and economics. How can risk be the focus of risk
management if the manager isn't knowledgeable about how management
activities will influence risk?
Although the examples given earlier may be informative, it would be
a vast oversimplification to suggest that their outcomes were solely
determined by linking or failing to link risk assessment with risk
management. Nevertheless, they tend to suggest that research is
warranted before we understand the limits of the NRC recommendation
for separating risk management from risk assessment. Under some
circumstances, the most effective risk management may require mending
the schism between assessment and management.
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